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Labor Strategies for Managing Today's Workforce

Can Officers and Directors Be Held Individually Liable Under State Law for Causing Employers to Violate the WARN Act?

December 19, 2022

by Nicholas J. Pappas and Marina Lyons

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In the face of recent reductions-in-force and predictions of a recession (Harriet Torry & Anthony DeBarros, Economists Now Expect a Recession, Job Losses by Next Year, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 2022), employment lawyers are dusting off their research regarding the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq., and similar state laws (the WARN Acts). These laws require employers to provide workers at least 60 days’ advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs.

Although the federal WARN Act has been in place for decades, only in recent years have courts addressed certain new theories for application of these laws to distressed companies considering the protections of the bankruptcy laws. In bankruptcy proceedings, employers have argued that WARN Act damages arising prior to filing of the bankruptcy petition constitute “general unsecured claims” subject to significant reduction in ultimate recoveries by workers.

To avoid such reductions, plaintiffs have begun to assert, and courts have considered, a number of creative claims against officers and directors for their participation in the employer’s violation of the WARN Acts.

At least two bankruptcy court decisions have allowed Chapter 7 trustees to assert certain state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty against officers and directors for causing the debtor to violate the WARN Act. In this article, we analyze one of these decisions and offer practical suggestions distressed employers should consider as they are contemplating compliance with the WARN Acts.

Background

The federal WARN Act allows for civil actions by employees for damages in the form of back pay for each day of violation and benefits under any employee benefit plan which would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had not occurred. 29 U.S.C. 2104(a)(1).

Although the WARN Acts contain exceptions to the notice requirement for “unforeseeable business circumstances,” where the employer is a “faltering company” and for “natural disasters,” the existence of an employer’s financial distress or even a bankruptcy filing does not excuse liability under the WARN Acts. 29 U.S.C. §2102(b)(1)-(2); e.g., Ien v. TransCare (In re TransCare), 614 B.R. 187, 209-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).

More specifically, 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(4)-(5) provide fourth priority status to unsecured claims for wages, salaries and commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, and sick leave pay earned by an individual, and fifth priority status to unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan. There is a maximum amount allowable per individual for such claims, and any amount exceeding that limit is a general unsecured claim, entitled to lower priority, which amount, therefore, will be paid at a lower level, and potentially at a fraction of its full value. Id. WARN Act damages arising after the filing of the bankruptcy petition are deemed administrative expenses and paid on a second priority basis. E.g., In re Hanlin Group, 176 B.R. at 333.

Courts historically have refused to hold individuals liable for a company’s failure to provide timely WARN notices. E.g., Cruz v. Robert Abbey, 778 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Against this backdrop, in 2015 the Delaware bankruptcy court refused to dismiss the Chapter 7 trustee’s claims against the sole manager and president of an insolvent corporation for breach of fiduciary duty based on these individuals’ failure to cause the employer to provide the requisite 60-day notice under the WARN Act. See Stanziale v. MILK072011 (In re Golden Guernsey Dairy), 548 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).

‘In re TransCare’

In 2016, a network of paratransit and medical transit businesses commonly referred to as TransCare abruptly failed and commenced Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. Ien v. TransCare (In re TransCare), 638 B.R. 691, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022). More than 1,000 employees were terminated with essentially no notice. At least two litigations ensued, each arising out of TransCare’s alleged failure to give timely WARN Act notice.

Shameeka Ien brought a class action against debtor TransCare Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary debtors, against non-debtor entities and their affiliates, as well as against Lynn Tilton, who owned and controlled the entity defendants. Id. Ien named Tilton as a defendant only on claims asserted under state wage payment law, not on the WARN Act claims. Id.

The Chapter 7 trustee commenced a separate adversary proceeding on behalf of the estates of TransCare and its debtor-affiliates against Tilton, TransCare, and its debtor-affiliates, asserting certain claims for relief, including claims for breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith against Tilton. In re TransCare Corporation, 2020 WL 8021060, at *1. After conducting a trial, the court ruled that Tilton breached her fiduciary duties by failing to maximize the value of TransCare when she decided to sell the company, and by formulating and executing a plan to restructure the business’s affairs through a foreclosure by secured lenders she controlled of certain assets to be transferred to an affiliated entity that Tilton also controlled. Id. at *23.

The trustee also claimed that Tilton breached her fiduciary duties to TransCare based on the failure of TransCare to give adequate notice of mass layoffs to its employees as required by the WARN Act. The trustee sought a declaratory judgment that Tilton was responsible for indemnifying the estate of TransCare for the WARN Act liability because (1) TransCare had no such liability prior to Tilton’s breach of loyalty and she must bear that liability in order to put TransCare back to where it was prior to the breach; (2) the WARN Act liability was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Tilton’s actions; and (3) under Delaware law, a corporate officer or director who knowingly causes the corporation to violate the law necessarily fails to act in good faith and thereby breaches her fiduciary duty of loyalty. Id. at *28.

According to the trustee, Tilton purposely chose not to issue a WARN Act notice because she did not want TransCare’s employees to look for new jobs. Id. at *29. The claim is based on an email exchange, which Tilton noted that she did not want to inform employees about the bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure because she “didn’t want to mass exodus.” Id.

The court concluded that the evidence relied on by the trustee did not support imposing an obligation on Tilton to indemnify the estate on the theory that she caused those violations in bad faith. Id. To establish bad faith, the court reasoned that the trustee had to demonstrate that Tilton’s conduct in failing to provide the WARN Act notice sooner was “qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.” Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006)).

The court noted that while Tilton did not want to give the notice until the foreclosure was completed, evidence showed that she still subjectively believed that TransCare had adequate time to send the WARN Act notices. Id. The trustee failed to show that Tilton deliberately delayed the timing of the WARN Act notices because she did not care about the requirements of the WARN Act or that her actions were the product of calculated wrongdoing or intentional disregard of her responsibilities with TransCare. Id.

Accordingly, while the court concluded that Tilton breached her fiduciary duties, as described above, the trustee did not submit sufficient evidence to prove that the breach was based on her causing TransCare to violate the WARN Act.

Practice Pointers

While the Chapter 7 trustee in TransCare was unable to prove that Tilton breached her fiduciary duty based on WARN Act violations, the court nonetheless considered the claim and evaluated whether the trustee submitted sufficient evidence of Tilton’s intentional disregard of her fiduciary duties. Future plaintiffs may be emboldened by TransCare to assert similar claims against officers and directors, in the hopes of proving a greater level of culpability than was shown in TransCare.

In response, officers and directors may argue that such state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty are preempted by the WARN Act and are otherwise not permitted by applicable state law. For example, at least one state court has held that employees had no standing to assert derivatively on behalf of their employer claims for breach of fiduciary duty against company officers for failure to provide timely WARN Act notices. See Calixto v. Couglin, 113 N.E.3d 329, 335 (Mass. 2018). It remains to be seen how other courts will resolve these issues.

Future employers in financial distress, like TransCare, similarly may be tempted to avoid or delay issuing a WARN Act notice because of concern for adverse consequences to the business. For example, employers may be concerned that providing WARN notice may cause customers to discontinue transacting business with the employer or negatively impact employee morale. However, in light of the In re TransCare and In re Golden Guernsey Dairy distressed employers also should consider the risk of claims by terminated employees against their officers and directors. Employers also should consider the impact of such litigation in the form of claims by officers and directors against the employer for indemnification under corporate governance documents or for coverage under the employer’s insurance policies.

Obviously the easiest way for employers to avoid litigation resulting from violation of the WARN Acts is to arrange for sufficient notice to employees prior to plant closings or mass layoffs in compliance with those laws.

Where such notice is impracticable, employers should consider the application of the exceptions to the notice requirements contained in the WARN Acts. But, even in cases where an exception applies, employers should be mindful of the requirement in the federal WARN Act that employers “shall give as much notice as is practicable and at that time shall give a brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification period.” 29 U.S.C. §2102(b)(3).


Reprinted with permission from the December 7, 2022 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 - reprints@alm.com.

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

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EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). 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SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.