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Labor Strategies for Managing Today's Workforce

Should employers who maintain an ongoing practice of paying workers severance benefits implement a formal written ERISA plan to govern the award of severance?

June 6, 2023

by Nicholas J. Pappas and Victoria del Campo

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Following the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increases and the resulting volatility in the stock markets, economists and government officials continue to debate whether the country will experience a hard or soft landing, or no landing at all. While some sectors of the economy remain strong, others have begun to see layoffs. In the face of this uncertainty, employers facing the prospect of downsizing would be wise to take steps now to minimize the financial risks from litigation by workers who suffer loss of employment.

Employers planning reductions-in-force frequently seek to reduce their exposure to employment litigation by offering affected workers severance benefits in exchange for waivers of their employment litigation claims. While some businesses maintain formal policies governing their severance pay practices, others choose to provide discretionary severance benefits on a case-by-case basis. Employers in this latter group often are surprised to learn that offering workers severance pay on an ad hoc basis can itself lead to claims for additional severance benefits. Employees frequently have argued in litigation that an employer’s informal severance practice actually created a welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”).

In this article we discuss the legal standards courts apply in deciding whether an employer’s past practice of providing severance pay establishes an ERISA plan, and we offer practical suggestions for employers considering layoffs to mitigate the risk of unexpected liability for severance.

Background

Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to set the standard for most retirement and welfare benefit plans established by private employers. Id. at § 1002(3). By enacting ERISA Congress sought to protect the interests of participants and their beneficiaries in receiving promised benefits. For this reason, ERISA empowers a participant or beneficiary of an employee benefit plan to bring a civil action to recover benefits due. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.

ERISA defines an employee welfare benefit plan as (1) any plan, fund, or program, (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, (4) for one of the purposes enumerated, (5) for participants or their beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). Factors (2) through (5) generally can be satisfied with respect to an ongoing informal severance pay practice. Courts, however, have struggled in determining whether Congress intended the words “plan, fund or program” to include an ongoing, informal severance pay practice.

In Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (11th Cir. 1982) the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer established an ERISA plan if a reasonable person would be able to ascertain (1) the intended benefits, (2) the intended beneficiaries, (3) the source of financing and (4) the procedures for receiving benefits. In the years immediately after Donovan, the Supreme Court decided two cases that clarified the situations where employers established ERISA plans by making certain types of payments to employees upon termination of employment. In Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119, (1989) the Supreme Court acknowledged that states traditionally regulated payment of wages, and therefore held that the vacation pay practice in that case did not fall within the scope of ERISA. In Ft. Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) the Supreme Court held that a severance payment made as a “one-time, lump-sum” did not create the need for an administrative operation and thus did not constitute an ERISA plan. Following Morash and Ft. Halifax, courts nevertheless have continued to cite to Donovan in analyzing whether an informal practice to offer severance pay constituted an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Grimo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 34 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Donovan); Baldo v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 48 Fed. Appx. 10, *11 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2002) (same).

Administrative Scheme

Courts in the Second Circuit have moved away from a strict application of the Donovan factors, focusing more on the frequency and “past practice” of making severance payments and the existence of an ongoing administrative scheme. In Okun v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 2015) the Second Circuit identified the following considerations to help courts determine whether there is an ongoing administrative scheme:

  1. whether there is managerial discretion in the plan administration;
  2. whether a reasonable employee would perceive an ongoing commitment by the employer to provide benefits; and
  3. whether the employer was required to analyze the circumstances of each employee's termination separately.

In Wimberly v. Automotivemastermind Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, 2021 WL 230299, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied these factors to find that an offer of a lump sum amount to one employee as severance pay did not establish an ERISA plan. Wimberly arose out of the discharge of an employee who billed expenses to other persons’ rooms while attending a sales conference for his employer Automotivemastermind Inc. (“aM”). When confronted about the hotel charges, the plaintiff refused to sign his warning and commenced a petition for pre-action discovery (“Petition”) to discover the identity of his accusers and clear his name.

Shortly after plaintiff filed his Petition, aM terminated his employment. aM offered the employee six weeks of severance pay in exchange for dismissal of his Petition and his execution of a waiver and release of claims. The plaintiff refused, and instead claimed aM owed him severance under a “plan” which aM denied.

The Wimberly plaintiff asserted that aM had a plan within the meaning of ERISA because two former aM employees allegedly received offers of severance upon termination of their employment. Unpersuaded the Wimberly court reasoned that this fact alone does not establish an ongoing administrative program because aM's offers of severance, to the plaintiff and the two other employees were based on a simple arithmetical calculation, obviating any need for managerial discretion or ongoing administrative efforts.

Then relying on Ft. Halifax, the Wimberly court found that there was no ongoing commitment to provide benefits considering the one-time nature of the severance offer. Moreover, the complaint allegations supported that aM and its managers made an ad hoc determination that a severance payment in exchange for the release of all claims would facilitate a speedy dissolution of their relationship with the plaintiff and his pending Petition.

Employment Agreements

In contrast with Wimberly, other courts have held that arrangements affecting only one employee may establish an ERISA plan. For example, in Thomas v. Command Alkon Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89149, *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2023) the court found that an employment agreement providing severance if the employee resigned for good reason was an employee benefit plan with an administrative scheme subject to ERISA.

In Thompson, the employee worked with Libra Systems, Inc. which was purchased by Command Alkon in November 2020. During the sale negotiations, Libra’s owners insisted that Command Alkon enter into an employment agreement with Thompson for a fixed period. Command Alkon agreed to that offer. The employment agreement also provided Thompson severance pay if her employment ended prior to the fixed period for good reason.

Before the end of the fixed period, Thompson asserted that she had good reason to terminate her employment. Thompson sought severance pay, but the employment agreement provided for severance pay only if she executed a waiver and release of claims. Thompson did not execute a waiver and release, but still claimed entitlement to severance in the amount of $467,424.62.

The Thompson court reasoned that there was an administrative scheme, because Thompson’s eligibility to collect severance pay was set forth in the employment agreement, which turned on whether she resigned with good reason, and Command Alkon exercised managerial discretion in categorizing the circumstances of the termination of the employment agreement. Although the employment agreement applied only to Thompson, the court cited various cases in sister circuits which support the proposition that contracts with one employee can constitute an ERISA plan, provided that an “administrative scheme” is established.

Tips to Avoid Liability

Employers should consider whether their past practices for paying severance inadvertently has crossed the legal threshold for the creation of an ERISA plan. If the past practice has established an ERISA plan, employers may have unwittingly subjected themselves to ERISA’s reporting and disclosure obligations which come with penalties for non-compliance. For example, ERISA requires that the plan be in writing, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), that participants be given summary plan descriptions, Id., § 1024(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, 25.20.102-3, that a claims procedure be established, 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b), that a plan administrator make certain documents available for examination by plan participants and beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)(1), and that the administrator file a Form 5500 with the U.S. Department of Labor. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1. An employer's failure to file a Form 5500 may result in a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day from the date of noncompliance. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). If a violation of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements is deemed willful, the employer may be subject to criminal liability, including a fine of not more than $5,000 for an individual or $100,000 for non-individuals and up to one-year imprisonment. Id. at § 1132(c)(2); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1131.

An employer with an ongoing practice of paying severance to terminated workers and which thereby risks subjecting itself to ERISA should consider implementing a written plan and otherwise complying with ERISA’s requirements. First and foremost, such an employer demonstrates its adherence to and respect for the law. Further, such an employer avoids the risk of incurring penalties and costly enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Labor which enforces ERISA’s requirements. Similarly, by having a written plan an employer may improve its employee relations by awarding of benefits to workers who experience loss of employment.

An employer with a written plan also may control the circumstances when severance will be paid through careful drafting. For example, employers can preclude an award of severance pay if the employer terminates employment upon a sale of the business or upon outsourcing a business unit, where the buyer or a contractor offers comparable employment to the worker following termination. An employer may preclude or reduce an award of severance where the employer provides its workers pay in lieu of notice under the WARN Act or similar state laws. An employer also can preclude the employees with individual employment agreements from “double dipping” so that they do not receive severance both under the plan and under their individual agreements. A plan may preclude severance pay for employees terminated “for cause” or who voluntarily resign. Finally, a plan may require as a condition to an award of severance that the employee first sign a release of all claims against the employer.

Armed with a written plan, employers also benefit from ERISA’s preemption of state law. Thus, employers can avoid claims for liquidated damages under state wage payment statutes, or for punitive damages under the common law. ERISA also allows employers to draft clauses according them broad discretion in interpreting their plans, and courts have upheld such clauses absent interpretations deemed arbitrary and capricious.


Reprinted with permission from the June 6, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.

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SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?