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What risks do employers face by excluding coverage for gender affirming care in their health plans?

August 2, 2023

by Nicholas J. Pappas and Nathan J. Ebnet

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In recent years, courts have ruled upon a growing number of cases arising from delivery of and payment for gender affirming care. At the same time, state legislatures have passed a variety of laws aimed at such services. Some states enacted affirmative legal protections for patients and providers (e.g., Colorado, Illinois, and Minnesota) while others sought to restrict or prohibit services available in their states (e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida). Within the past two years alone, more than 30 states have enacted legislation regarding gender affirming care. Litigants continue to challenge many of these laws in court.

The law governing restrictions placed on the delivery of gender affirming care will continue to develop as litigants’ challenges work their way through the legal system. But even now, federal courts have provided guidance for the prudent employer and third-party administrator to evaluate their own policies regarding health care plan coverage for gender affirming care. Because a number of courts have held that a health care benefit plan’s denial of coverage for gender affirming care discriminates against individuals on the basis of sex when physicians opine that those treatments are medically necessary, health plan sponsors should consider whether to prophylactically eliminate plan provisions that unconditionally exclude coverage for transgender benefits.

In this article, we provide an overview of the law governing the availability of gender affirming care, we discuss how the law affects benefit plans, and we offer practical suggestions for employers as they evaluate how to structure their health care benefit plans.

Terms

Gender affirming care means the provision of health care to transgender people in an effort to align their gender expression (external characteristics and behaviors) with their gender identity (innate, psychological sense of gender). Gender affirming care may include mental health counseling and additional medical interventions such as puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, or surgery. Gender affirming care treats gender dysphoria, i.e., the distress caused by the discrepancy between a person’s gender expression and their gender identity.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, recognizes gender dysphoria as a mental health condition. Gender dysphoria can cause anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation. Accordingly, the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, and American Psychiatric Association have expressed support for treatment of gender dysphoria with gender affirming care.

Legislative Background

Although many in the medical community have expressed support for gender affirming care, a number of states have sought to restrict the practice, particularly for minors. In 2021, Arkansas became the first state in the country to ban gender affirming care for transgender minors. Since then, at least 12 other states have restricted gender affirming care for minors and/or adults, and at least 30 states have introduced similar legislation in 2023. Should they become law, states may enforce these restrictions through a variety of means, including criminal, civil, and/or professional penalties for clinicians who provide services, and in some instances, penalties for parents of children who support their children’s access to services.

Patients, parents, and physicians have challenged these recent legislative efforts in court. Plaintiffs commonly argue that governmental bans on gender affirming care discriminate on the basis of sex and therefore violate their equal protection and due process rights. The federal courts have generally treated these arguments favorably by either partially or permanently blocking state laws in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, and Kentucky. But see L.W. v. Skrmetti, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 17234 (6th Cir. July 8, 2023) (refusing to block Tennessee’s ban on gender affirming care while Sixth Circuit considers an expedited appeal).

For example, in Doe v. Ladapo, plaintiffs challenged Florida’s statute and rules that sought to prohibit transgender minors from receiving puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99603 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023). Plaintiffs argued that the laws discriminated on the basis of sex because the same treatments were legal in other contexts, e.g., treating a natal male adolescent with testosterone. The court agreed with plaintiffs’ arguments, reasoning “[g]ender identity is real,” “[t]he widely accepted standard of care calls for evaluation and treatment [of gender dysphoria],” and Florida’s purported justifications for the challenged legislation “are largely pretextual.”

Insurance Background

Lawsuits involving gender affirming care extend beyond the recent challenges to state legislation. A number of transgender individuals and/or their parents/guardians have sued employers and third-party administrators related to health insurance policies that exclude coverage for transgender benefits, either categorically or by excluding specific treatments for gender dysphoria (e.g., limiting or excluding surgical benefits). Plaintiffs commonly allege violations of the Affordable Care Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Affordable Care Act (Section 1557) includes broad civil rights protections in health care, barring discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability. The Obama administration interpreted Section 1557’s ban on sex discrimination to bar discrimination based on gender identity. In 2020, the Trump administration reversed course. But in 2021, the Biden administration restored the Obama administration’s interpretation in Executive Order 13988, bolstered by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), in which the Court recognized that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity.

Like Title VII, Section 1557 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and extends that prohibition to health programs or activities that receive federal funding. The phrase “health program or activity” includes federally funded contracts of insurance; Section 1557 therefore prohibits sex discrimination in certain health insurance contracts. Schmitt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Washington, 965 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2020); but see Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, 513 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1136 (D.N.D. 2021) (holding that health insurers are subject to Section 1557 only for the parts of their operations that receive federal funding).

Increasing Litigation

Since 2017, several federal courts have found that blanket exclusions for gender affirming care violate federal law. One such case is C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227832 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2022).

In C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, plaintiffs—a transgender boy of 17 and his mother—argued that Blue Cross violated Section 1557 when it administered a self-funded health care plan, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., that categorically excluded from coverage transgender benefits. Plaintiff C.P. had gender dysphoria and sought hormone therapy treatment, and later, chest reconstruction surgery. Blue Cross initially covered the hormone therapy by mistake; it later notified plaintiff C.P. that subsequent treatment would not be covered. The relevant exclusionary language provided: “Transgender Reassignment Surgery Not Covered: Benefits shall not be provided for treatment, drugs, therapy, counseling services and supplies for, or leading to, gender reassignment surgery.” Importantly, the plan at issue generally covered care for hormone therapy, mastectomies, and chest reconstruction if that care was considered medically necessary for diagnoses other than for gender affirming care.

In granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court relied on Bostock and Ninth Circuit precedent to conclude that the plan discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Section 1557. The trigger for denial of coverage was a diagnosis of gender dysphoria; according to the court, gender dysphoria cannot be understood without reference to sex.1

The court also determined that Blue Cross’s arguments regarding the purported lack of medical consensus for gender affirming care were “immaterial” because (1) “[Blue Cross] did not base the decision to deny care on medical necessity but on [plaintiff] C.P.’s . . . transgender status,” and (2) the treatment at issue would be considered medically necessary under Blue Cross’ own medical necessity policy.

In Fain v. Crouch, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313 (S.D. Va. 2022), plaintiffs—transgender individuals who received healthcare through the West Virginia Medicaid Program—also challenged the plan’s exclusion of surgical treatment for gender dysphoria. Unlike the plan in C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, the plan here covered some treatments for gender affirming care, such as mental health counseling and hormone therapy. Plaintiffs brought equal protection and Section 1557 claims.

The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because the challenged exclusion denied medically necessary surgeries for transgender people that the same plan covered for reasons other than gender dysphoria. The court was not persuaded that the plan’s coverage of some transgender benefits, like hormone therapy, was a defense to plaintiffs’ claims. Relying on Bostock, the court stated: “Simply because the [plan] does not discriminate in all aspects does not permit it to discriminate narrowly against transgender surgical care.” Id. at 326.

Practice Pointers

Although the rules applicable to the provision of and payment for gender affirming care continue to develop, employers should assess how recent cases may be instructive to them. As noted above, a number of federal courts have recognized that categorical denial of coverage for transgender benefits constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex that triggers the protections of Section 1557 and federal anti-discrimination laws. Employers, therefore, should consider on a prophylactic basis whether to eliminate from their group health plans categorical exclusions of transgender benefits.

Similarly, employers should think carefully about policies that label gender affirming care as “cosmetic” or “elective,” descriptions of the medical treatments which result in exclusion of the care from coverage. In particular factual circumstances where the care was considered medically necessary, some courts have considered such practices discriminatory. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Precynthe, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2018) (summarizing case law in which courts determined transgender benefits were not merely cosmetic treatments, but, instead, medically necessary treatments to address serious medical disease).

Employers also should think carefully about excluding coverage for specific services to treat gender dysphoria if those same services are covered in other contexts, e.g., if a plan excludes coverage for medically necessary mastectomies to treat gender dysphoria while covering the same procedure for non-gender dysphoria related diagnoses. See, e.g., Fain v. Crouch, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 326.

Finally, employers should monitor developments in the state laws. In stark contrast to recent federal jurisprudence, states such as Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma have pending bills that affirmatively bar insurers from offering coverage for gender affirming care. Texas, Wyoming, and New Hampshire have pending bills that categorize gender affirming care as child abuse under state law.


1The plan at issue was the Catholic Health Initiatives Medical Plan. Accordingly, Blue Cross also argued that it was protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) because the plan was based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. The court rejected Blue Cross’s defense on the ground that the RFRA is inapplicable in cases where the government is not a party. But see Religious Sisters of Mercy, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (granting coalition of Catholic entities permanent injunctive relief pursuant to RFRA from provision or coverage of gender affirming care).


Reprinted with permission from the August 2, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.

Firm Highlights

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.